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federal administration makes a sure prediction on how much leeway will be
allowed the states at least theoretically difficult.
The existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme would afford
ample grounds for implying Congressional intent to foreclose state action.
There would always be the danger of a "mischievous conflict," produced when
the federal and state agencies, acting on the same subject matter and
applying similar standards, arrive at different results. 87 The problem of
"forum-shopping" would also arise." A consideration of the practicalities of
the situation, however—the necessity for immediate and thoroughgoing action,
the demonstrated ability of at least some of the states to accomplish results,
and the sheer inadequacy of any federal program, however grandly conceived,
to reach and regulate every aspect of the problem and to remedy every indi-
vidual wrong technically within the scope of the act—outweighs the diffi-
culties and dangers threatened by concurrent federal and state regulation.
Indeed, it is submitted, if any area calls for concerted action, it is that of
employment discrimination. The decision in Colorado v. Continental should
have the effect of encouraging rather than limiting such action, regardless of
potential Congressional action.
JEROME K. FROST
Securities Exchange Act—Treatment of Intrastate Use of Telephone.—
Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc.'—and Nemitz v. Cunny. 2—In the
Rosen case, the plaintiff brings an action under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19343
 alleging misrepresentations and failures to dis-
close by the defendant during transactions for the sale of securities con-
ducted in part through telephone conversations. At the time of the telephone
conversations both parties were within the city limits of Philadelphia. In this
hearing on a motion which the court treated as a motion for summary
judgment, the fundamental issue concerned the determination of whether
this use of the telephone was a transaction in interstate or intrastate corn-
87 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., supra note 11,
at 775.
Pennsylvania, six of whose cities have Fair Employment ordinances, provides
for an election of forum by the party and then foreclosure. It also provides for the
possibility of conflict by declaring that the state rule is to be applied by municipal
courts in event of conflict. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43, 962(b).
1 218 F. Supp. 473 (ED. Pa. 1963),
2 221 F. Supp. 571 (ND. Ill. 1963).
2 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 4 78j (1958).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange
. 	 .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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merce. The court in granting summary judgment for the defendant HELD:
The specific use of the telephone by two parties within the same state is the
use of an instrumentality in intrastate commerce in spite of its possible use
in interstate commerce. The plaintiff, therefore, has no right to relief under
the Act.
One week prior to the decision of the Rosen case the United States Dis-
trict Court, Northern District of Illinois arrived at a conflicting conclusion
in the case of Nemitz v. Cunny. In the latter case a seller of securities brought
an action under section 10(b) alleging a fraudulent sale of securities as a
result of telephone conversations between parties in the same state. On a
motion to dismiss which precipitated much the same issue as in Rosen, the
court HELD: The telephone is an instrumentality of interstate commerce,
and section 10(b) extends td its use even in local transactions.
With no case or statutory law on point both courts were compelled to
decide this issue as a matter of first impression. The Rosen court takes the
more narrow viewpoint in arguing that the telephone is an instrument of
interstate commerce, but is equally an instrument of intrastate commerce, and
that the prevailing characteristic depends upon the use of the instrument at
a given time. The two characteristics are treated as alternatives and not
co-existent. For support the court depends on an analogous treatment by
Mr. Justice Holmes of the locomotive as an instrumentality .° The court
alludes also to the more supporting language of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 which uses the wording, "use of . . . instruments
. . in interstate commerce" (Emphasis added.)° and Section 1343 of
the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act which refers to "wire, radio, or
television communication in interstate or foreign commerce. . . ." (Empha-
sis added.)° The court points out that the District Court, Northern District
of Illinois (which later decided the Nemitz case), said in 1952, "The
purpose of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
are similar and the phraseology employed is substantially similar." 7
On this point the Nemitz court arrives at the opposite conclusion in
holding that "It is clear that the use of a telephone constitutes the use of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce, unless of course the telephone is
merely a part of a private or inter-office hookup." This conclusion derives
little or no direct support from the cases cited because none of them was
4 Minneapolis & St. Louis P.R. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, 357 (1917).
5 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
6 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act § 18(a), 70 Stat. 523 (1956), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1958).
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of ex-
ecuting such scheme or artifice, shall be ... [penalized].
7 Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 964 (ND. Ill.
1952).
8 Supra note 2, at 573.
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confronted with the intrastate use of the telephone .° The Nemitz court is
actually the first to hold specifically that the telephone shall qualify as an
instrumentality of interstate commerce for purposes of section 10 (b) regard-
less of its local use in a particular circumstance.
The second point of conflict involves the question of whether or not
Congress intended to extend its control over securities transactions into the
area of intrastate activities. The two courts agree that there is ample authority
for the proposition that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate com-
merce when it is necessary for the protection of interstate commerce.th The
Rosen court dismisses the question summarily based on the language of the
Act. "We are not here concerned with abstract considerations of power, but
with actual manifestations of Congressional purpose and intent."n The
Nemitz court takes an equally firm but opposite stand in declaring: "[U]nder
a clear reading of the statute, it is certain that [section 10(b)] would apply
to the facts of this case even though there are involved an intrastate transac-
tion and a closed corporation. . . .'"° (Italics in original.)
Support by analogy might be drawn from the exercise of this power
by Congress in other areas of interstate commerce to meet "burdens and
obstructions . . . [which exercise] is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce.'" 3
The Nemitz court admits the lack of direct authority, however, in saying,
"the construction I have placed upon [section 10(b)] . . . , under the facts
of this case, goes beyond what any other case has held. . . . »14
Since the heart of the question concerns how wide a net Congress in-
tended to cast in using the words "instrumentalities of interstate commerce,"
a logical key to the problem is the expressed purpose of the Act. No re-
phrasing of the words of section 2 of,the Actl° could express the purpose more
clearly:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securi-
ties as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-
counter markets are affected with a national public interest which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such
transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . . . , and
to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and
control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect inter-
state commerce, . .. and to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in such transactions.
9 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1944); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650 (1896); Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1
(1894); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881) ; Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
10 E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936); Lipinski v.
United States, 251 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1958).
11 Supra note 1, at 476.
12 Supra note 2, at 573.
18 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 10, at 36.
14 Supra note 2, at 575.
19 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958).
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The dangerous practices at which this Act is aimed could easily be
adapted to fall outside of a narrow reading of the provisions of the Act. The
courts have consistently taken the liberal view necessary to effect that
"reasonably complete and effective" control. For example, in Fratt v. Robin-
son16
 the court held that section 10(b) applies to all securities transactions
in spite of the fact that they are not handled on or through any securities
exchange or any stock dealing organization, nor by any person connected
with any business sometimes referred to as "over-the-counter" markets or
businesses. Notice also that although there is no specific provision in section
10(b) for a private right of action, the courts have consistently read this
provision into the Act.n
Perhaps the most dramatic indication that the courts have caught the
spirit and intent of the Act is that section 10(b) has been held to apply to
cases in which the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce were
used only incidentally in a fraudulent transaction but played no part in
directly conveying the fraudulent material or information." The inescapable
conclusion is that the courts have extended section 10(b) to the limit in
every direction in order to encompass and totally behead this elusive Hydra
—fraudulent and sharp practices in the securities market.
Control of the intrastate use of an interstate instrument would not
be without precedent. In a case involving a railroad, the Supreme Court held
that Congress, in the exercise of its paramount power, may prevent the
common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse
from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate
commerce. 1° In a case involving the National Labor Relations Board, the
Supreme Court held that if intrastate activities have such a close relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from uses inimical to the welfare and public policy of the
country as a whole, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control 2 0 Most directly on point is the line of federal cases in which Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act is held to apply to intrastate tele-
phone communications. In Lipinski v. United States, 21 the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit upheld a conviction under section 605 for intercepting
intrastate communications. The words of the court are pertinent:
All of the telephone communications referred to in the indict-
ment were intrastate communications. But Congress has plenary
power to enact appropriate legislation for the government of inter-
state commerce, . . . and within the range of that power lies power
to regulate intrastate activities when it is necessary for the protec-
tion of interstate commerce.
16 Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 9.
17 E.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947).
is Supra note 7.
16 Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1913).
20 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 10.
21 Lipinski v. United States, supra note 10.
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[T]he fact that the system . . . was used in both intrastate
and interstate commerce did not derogate from the application of
Section 605 to the particular telephones or telephone lines referred
to in the indictment.22
Turning to the wording of section 10(b) itself it is clear that the
transaction need not be interstate just as long as some "means or instru-
mentality of interstate comerce" 23 is in some way involved. It is also
significant that when Congress wrote the comparable Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 193324 the wording used was "use of any means or instru-
ments . . . in interstate commerce."(Emphasis added.) This language seems
to direct the kind of "use" test that the Rosen court proposes. But in sec-
tion 10(b) Congress has changed this wording to "use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce."26 (Emphasis added.) This would
indicate that Congress was shifting its aim from the incidental use to the
instrument itself. In this light the telephone is indisputably an instrument
"of interstate commerce." These several factors indicate that when future
courts reach this cross-road they will undoubtedly be inclined in the direction
of the Nemitz decision.
JOHN F. DOBBYN
Taxation—Calculation of Corporate Earnings and Profits—Cash Basis
Association—Accrual of Federal Taxes Due in Determining Earnings
and Profits.—Demmon v. United States.'—The plaintiffs received and paid
taxes on a trust distribution and now seek to recover a refund. The Tax
Court had determined that the distributing body, Land Trust, which had
computed and paid its taxes at trust rates, was an association taxable at
corporate rates. 2 The court disallowed its distribution deduction and asserted
a substantial additional tax for the years in questions In any one of the
years under examination, the amount of cash available for distribution out
of earnings and profits would have been less than the amount actually
distributed if the additional federal taxes due on current earnings had been
deducted. The plaintiffs' yearly distribution from the trust was thus made up
of not only earnings and profits of that tax year, but also of payments from
some other fund-source of Land Trust (a distributing body which the
government was now treating as a corporation for tax purposes). Their theory
for a refund was that the difference between the amount distributed each
22 Id. at 55-56.
23 Supra note 3.
24 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
25 Supra note 3.
321 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1963).
2 Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 774 (1956), affirmed on this issue,
266 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1959).
3 The substantial additional tax totaled $500,000 for the years 1945 to 1955.
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